For decades, U.S. policy toward Africa has been marked by broad bipartisan consensus. Regardless of who occupied the White House, Washington’s strategy has largely remained the same — focusing on development aid, promoting democracy and human rights, and maintaining security cooperation. However, global and domestic upheavals — from the Covid-19 pandemic to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and deep political polarization within the U.S. — have changed how Africans view Washington. The upcoming American presidential election could therefore have meaningful implications for U.S.-Africa relations and for how the United States is perceived on the continent.
Africa’s Changing Expectations
Africans no longer expect major policy shifts from new U.S. administrations. Even President Obama, whose African heritage once raised hopes, largely continued traditional U.S. policies that prioritized American interests over African aspirations. The Biden administration’s pledges to amplify African voices internationally have also fallen short, reinforcing a sense of American inconsistency. As a result, African governments have diversified partnerships — turning increasingly toward China, Russia, Turkey, and the UAE — to reduce dependence on the U.S.
Limited Policy Differences Ahead
Despite political polarization in Washington, Africa should expect continuity rather than transformation, regardless of whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump wins. Both sides acknowledge Africa’s strategic importance but view it primarily through the lens of U.S. interests. Harris would likely continue Biden’s 2022 Africa strategy focused on inclusion and diplomacy, while Trump might pursue a more transactional and less values-based approach — one some African leaders view as more pragmatic. Yet neither approach promises a major shift in priorities.
Key Policy Areas
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Trade: The renewal of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2025 will be a major test. Its benefits remain unevenly distributed, and political disputes — such as suspensions over governance or social issues — risk further alienating African partners.
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Ukraine and Global Conflicts: The war in Ukraine has raised costs and disrupted food supplies in Africa. Trump’s pledge to quickly end the conflict might appeal to Africans, while a Harris administration’s continued support for Ukraine could sustain frustration.
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Military Presence: The U.S. faces growing skepticism over its security role in Africa. While Harris would likely maintain limited partnerships, Trump might favor reducing troops — a move some African leaders could welcome, while others might see it as abandonment.
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Great Power Competition: Both parties still frame Africa within U.S.-China rivalry, often prioritizing geopolitical strategy over genuine partnership. Africans increasingly exploit this competition to their advantage.
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Climate and Energy: African leaders reject Western restrictions on fossil fuel development. While Biden’s policies remain cautious, Trump’s pro-fossil stance might align more closely with African economic priorities.
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Immigration and Social Policies: Immigration bans under Trump and U.S. social-value conditions under Democrats (like LGBTQ rights or abortion policies) have both strained relations. Africans often perceive these as ideological or neocolonial intrusions.
Conclusion
The 2024 U.S. election will not revolutionize U.S.-Africa relations. Instead, it will test Washington’s ability to remain a credible and consistent partner amid eroding bipartisanship and intensifying global competition. Unless the next administration tailors its approach to African realities — emphasizing partnership rather than patronage — the U.S. risks losing further influence on a continent already looking elsewhere for allies.
